Nonetheless, it is puzzling that Congress is more polarized than the mass public, despite a continued emphasis on an "electoral connection" between members and the public.
Much of the literature on polarization has reconciled this puzzle by focusing on institutional explanations for why members are incentivized to move away from the median voter (e.g., party pressure, primaries, redistricting, etc.).
Less attention has been paid to the behavioral underpin nings of polarization. In this article, we seek to unpack the "electoral connection" via an examination of the mass public's attitudes toward partisan conflict in Congress.
To ship from individual members and from Congress as a whole. For instance, theories of party cues, party ratio nalization, and party branding (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Grynaviski 2010; Rahn 1993) Congress?"16 with the following five response options: "a great deal," "a lot," "a moderate amount," "a little," and "none." The main independent variable was a dummy in dicating whether respondents were assigned to the condi tion presenting Congress as bipartisan, with the partisan presentation as the baseline. Although we did not ex plicitly provide a control condition,17 the common con tent did include an item asking respondents about their overall approval of Congress on a 4-point scale ranging from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve" (ques tion CC335con), which can be used as a baseline.
Methods
In 
Pi represents the treatment effect among Independents.
The interpretation of the interaction terms is as follows. The effect of the bipartisan framing is about 12% of the effect of party identification. This is quite large given that party identification is considered to be one of the most important explanatory variables in the study of political behavior (Campbell et al. 1960 ). job performance. Forty-six percent of respondents re ported having little or no confidence in Congress in the "bipartisan" condition; this figure was 55% in the "parti san" condition. Although we did not include an explicit manipulation check,22 these results suggest that the treat ments achieved their desired objectives. A; -ol + Pi Bj + p2 SP{ + P3 WPj + P4(SP{ x Bj) between "bipartisan" condition and "partisan" condition.
(31 represents the treatment effect among Independents.
Similar to equation (2) who exhibited a less polarized voting record, but there was significant heterogeneity by strength of partisanship.
As illustrated in Figure 3 , strong identifiers negatively respond to the member when told that he is engaging in bipartisan behavior, whereas weak identifiers and Inde pendents are positively disposed to bipartisanship, which nets to an overall null effect. Returning to the statistical models in equations (3) and (4) Finally, these results reconceptualize previous expla nations of public attitudes toward Congress positing that the public's negative perception of the institution stems from members denigrating it for electoral benefit. Early work by Fenno (1975 Fenno ( ,1978 In addition, future work ought to explore why bipar tisanship is preferred by strong partisans in general, but not for individual members of Congress. One possibility is that strong partisans prefer that copartisan members engage in partisan behavior because the member is seen as protecting their interests. However, if these individuals view bipartisanship in Congress as a whole as occurring when the opposing party compromises its position (but when their own party does not), this seemingly paradox ical set of positions makes sense. That is, bipartisanship occurs when the other party moves from their preferred position. Leveraging differences in expectations for how likely "your side" prevails when they are in the major ity versus minority may help uncover whether people see bipartisanship as leading to more "wins" or "losses" for their side than would have occurred in the absence of bipartisanship.
Beyond the specific topic of inquiry in this article, 
